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1Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
by
MIKE BURKART, DENIS GROMB, AND FAUSTO PANUNZI∗
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and
by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their
shares. As private-benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value in-
creases with the bidder’s shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder
tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that
the posttakeover share value matches the bid price. Compared to a fully dispersed
target company, the bidder may have to offer a higher price either to win the block-
holder’s support or to attract enough shares from small shareholders. (JEL: G 34)
1 Introduction
Takeovers are considered an important check on managers of large public corpora-
tions; they allow the removal of managers who are not acting in the shareholders’
best interest. In addition, the mere threat of a takeover disciplines managers. Since
MANNE [1965] laid out the theoretical foundations for the study of takeovers, their
effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism has been questioned on different grounds,
such as agency problems within the acquiring firm or expropriation of the target
firm’s stakeholders. GROSSMAN AND HART [1980] and BRADLEY [1980] show that
managers who pursue self-serving actions need not be vulnerable to takeovers, even
though – or, more accurately, precisely because – ownership is widely dispersed.
Being too small to affect the outcome, each shareholder tenders only if the bid
price at least matches the posttakeover share value. The only way for the acquirer
to succeed in face of this free-rider problem is to offer a price so high that he does
not earn a profit. Consequently, he has no incentive to launch a bid, and inefficient
managers face no risk of being ousted.
Their analysis of the free-rider problem is the starting point of a large theoretical
literature exploring the dynamics of the tender offer process in various settings.
∗ We would like to thank Daniel Ferreira, Mariassunta Giannetti, Peter Mülbert,
Eva-Maria Steiger, and seminar participants at Bocconi (Milan), ECARES (Brussels),
Graduate School of Finance (Helsinki), the Norwegian School of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration (Bergen), the Swedish Institute for Financial Research (Stock-
holm), and the 2005 JITE conference on New Institutional Economics in Irsee for
helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are our own.
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A prominent theme in this literature is the role of the initial ownership structure,
in particular the effect of blockholders. Numerous papers analyse takeovers where
either a bidder or the incumbent management owns an initial stake. The role of block-
holders as tendering shareholders has so far received little attention in the theoretical
literature. The present paper aims to explore this dimension of blockownership in
takeovers. To this end we analyse takeovers of firms owned by a majority of atom-
istic shareholders and one minority blockholder who does not counterbid but merely
decides whether to tender or retain his shares. Our central result is that the pres-
ence of such a passive minority blockholder can force the bidder to offer a higher
premium than in the case of a fully dispersed target.
How the presence of a minority blockholder who merely decides to tender or
retain his shares affects the takeover outcome is also an empirically relevant ques-
tion. Outside the U.S. and U.K., widely dispersed ownership is not the preva-
lent organizational form, even for the largest listed corporations (e.g., LA PORTA,
LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [1999]). But even in the U.S. and U.K., many
listed firms have a shareholder owning 5% or 10% of the firm’s shares.1 Faced with
a takeover attempt, target blockholders often choose not to launch a counterbid
because they lack the financial resources or the managerial capabilities to run the
firm. Furthermore, institutional investors, such as pension funds, are forbidden to
launch tender offers.
In many existing takeover models, the presence of a passive minority blockholder
does not alter the outcome. (There are a few exceptions that we discuss later in
the paper.) In our model, it does, because the blockholder’s tendering decision in-
teracts with those of the small shareholders. The source of this interdependence
is a posttakeover incentive problem on the part of the successful bidder. As in
BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI [1998], the successful bidder can decide to
divert part of the revenues generated under his control as private benefits. Such
extraction is, however, associated with a convex deadweight loss. That is, the ex-
traction of private benefits is inefficient and exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
As the bidder owns more shares, he internalizes more of this inefficiency and
therefore extracts less private benefits, which implies a higher posttakeover share
value.
The positive relationship between posttakeover share value and bidder’s final
holding implies that the small shareholder’s supply in the tender offer depends on
the bid price and the number of shares tendered by the blockholder. As the bid price
increases, the posttakeover share value that leaves small shareholders indifferent
between tendering and retaining their shares also increases, and so must the fraction
of tendered shares. If small shareholders anticipate that the blockholder will tender
more shares, they will tender fewer shares to make the posttakeover share value
match the bid price.
1 GADOUM, LANG, AND YOUNG [2005] report that 59% of listed U.S. firms have
a blockholder owning (directly or indirectly) at least 10% of the firm’s shares. For
a representative sample of listed U.S. corporations HOLDERNESS [2005] finds that
93% of the firms have shareholders who own at least 5% of the company’s shares.
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Relative to the small shareholders, the blockholder has stronger incentives to ten-
der his shares, provided that the bid succeeds. Tendering additional shares increases
the bidder’s final stake. This in turn reduces the bidder’s incentives to extract private
benefits, thereby increasing the value of the large shareholder’s remaining shares.
Because this incentive persists whenever the bid price equals the posttakeover share
value, the blockholder must tender his entire block in equilibrium.
Selling all shares makes the minority blockholder potentially decisive for the out-
come, as the bidder’s optimal strategy is to attract as few shares as necessary to gain
control. The small shareholders’ free-rider behaviour prevents the bidder from mak-
ing a profit on the shares acquired in the tender offer. Hence, the bidder’s only source
of profit is the private benefits, which are decreasing in his final holding. The block-
holder, being decisive, can in turn matter because he also takes the value of his block
under the incumbent management into account when deciding whether to tender. By
contrast, small shareholders only compare bid price and posttakeover share value.
We compare the tender-offer outcomes in the presence and in the absence of
a minority blockholder. Within our framework, the optimal tender offer for a fully
dispersed target is such that the bid price matches the posttakeover share value
when 50% of the shares are tendered (BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI [1998]).
Any higher offer would attract more shares, thereby reducing the bidder’s private
benefits, while any lower offer would fail.2 The presence of a blockholder matters
if the per-share value of his minority block exceeds the posttakeover share value
when 50% of the shares are tendered. This possibility can arise for two reasons.
First, the blockholder may enjoy private benefits such that the per-share value of
his block exceeds the posttakeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered.
Therefore, the bidder has to increase the bid price either until the blockholder
favours the offer as he is compensated for the forgone private benefits, or until
the offer attracts enough shares (50%) from the small shareholders, making its
success independent of the blockholder’s decision. In either case, the higher bid
price increases the fraction of shares tendered and thereby reduces the bidder’s
takeover gains. When these smaller gains are not sufficient to cover the takeover
cost, the bidder refrains from undertaking a tender offer. Thus, whenever the presence
of a minority blockholder leads to a higher bid price, it also reduces the likelihood
of a takeover.
Second, a bid matching the posttakeover share value when 50% of the shares
are tendered may be below the share value under the incumbent management.3
The increase in the bid price due to the blockholder’s resistance may deter value-
decreasing bidders, who may find it too costly to take over the firm. When a value-
decreasing bidder is not deterred, the price increase reduces or even eliminates the
2 We focus here on equilibrium outcomes in which the tender offer succeeds. Fail-
ure of a conditional tender offer can always be supported as a Nash equilibrium out-
come, irrespective of the bid price and the presence of a minority blockholder.
3 In the case of a fully dispersed target, a value-decreasing bid can succeed against
the collective interest of the shareholders because tendering can be individually ration-
al as a hedge against the unfavourable minority position (BEBCHUK [1988]).
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decrease in security benefits he brings about. Thus, minority blockholders offer
protection – albeit not complete – against value-decreasing bidders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 shows
when, how, and to what extent a minority blockholder affects the tender offer’s
outcome. Section 4 discusses the case of value-decreasing bidders. Section 5 reviews
the related literature, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a firm with an incumbent blockholder (henceforth called the incumbent, I)
owning a fraction α < 50% of shares, the remaining 1 − α being dispersed among
many small shareholders. The firm is approached by a potential acquirer (henceforth
called the rival, R) who owns no shares. To gain control R has to make a public
tender offer in which he attracts at least 1/2 of the shares, which each carry one
vote. The shareholders can respond to R’s offer by either tendering (part of) their
shares or retaining them. There are no further options or choices available to any
player. In particular, none of the existing shareholders nor any other party can launch
a counterbid. Similarly, R cannot purchase shares on the open market or offer to
purchase I’s block. These restrictions are not meant to make the model more realistic
but to focus our analysis on the effect that the distribution of target ownership has
on the tender offer’s outcome.
Initially, a risk-neutral manager (M) is in charge of running the firm. If the
takeover does not materialize, M remains in control. For simplicity, we abstract
from any agency problems between M and the shareholders. Thus, M neither needs
to be induced to exert some productive effort nor needs to be prevented from
extracting a rent. Accordingly, there is no need to offer M any salary, or equivalently,
M’s compensation, including possible private benefits that he might receive in
a richer model, is normalized to zero. Under M’s control, shareholders obtain
security benefits vI per share.
We allow for the possibility that I enjoys private benefits. Some of the most
compelling evidence of private benefits comes from studies documenting that (mi-
nority) blocks trade at a considerable premium relative to the share value after the
announcement of the block trade (NENOVA [2003]; DYCK AND ZINGALES [2004]).
These benefits can come from different sources. They may take the form of trans-
actions with related parties, expropriation of corporate opportunities, or excessive
consultant fees, all at the expense of the small shareholders. Alternatively, they may
be the power and prestige that is associated with the control over a firm and the
influence it may give over social and political events. Such amenity potential does
not dilute the small shareholders’ claims (DEMSETZ AND LEHN [1985]).
Our interest is in the possible effect of I’s private benefits on the takeover outcome,
rather than in their source.4 Therefore, we assume that I obtains private benefits
4 BURKART AND PANUNZI [2006] and BURKART, PANUNZI, AND SHLEIFER [2003]
provide explicit models of private-benefit extraction both by the manager and by
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Λ ≥ 0. This reduced-form specification allows us to encompass different degrees
of conflicts between insiders and small shareholders. For Λ = 0, I and the small
shareholders have congruent interests. As Λ increases, their interests diverge and I
behaves increasingly like an insider with little equity interest. Sufficiently large
values of Λ are best viewed as I managing the firm himself. We denote the total
per-share value of I’s block as υ = vI +Λ/α.
The sequence of events in the tender offer unfolds as follows.
In stage 1, R makes a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional, unrestricted tender offer; he
submits a price b at which he has to buy all tendered shares, provided that he receives
at least 1/2 the shares. In addition, R must pay a cost c > 0, reflecting the expenses
of searching for a suitable target and preparing the bid.5
In stage 2, the shareholders simultaneously and noncooperatively decide whether to
tender. While I is aware that his decision may affect the outcome, small shareholders
are assumed to be homogeneous and atomistic: they do not perceive themselves as
pivotal for the outcome of the tender offer. Denote by γ ∈ [0, α] the fraction of
shares tendered by I , and by η ∈ [0, 1 − α] that tendered by the small shareholders.
In stage 3, if less than 1/2 of the shares are tendered, the offer fails and the status
quo prevails. Otherwise, R gains control and holds β ≥ 1/2 of the shares. In that
case, R decides how to allocate the firm’s resources: they may be used to generate
security benefits, which accrue to all shareholders, or private benefits, which only R
enjoys. This noncontractible decision is modeled as R’s choice of φ ∈ [0,1] such that
security benefits are (1 − φ)vR while private benefits are [φ − l(φ)]vR. The function
l(φ) represents the deadweight loss associated with private-benefit extraction.
ASSUMPTION 1 The loss function l(·) is strictly increasing and convex on [0,1],
with l(0) = 0, l′(0) = 0, and l′(1) > 1.
As in BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI [1998] and SHLEIFER AND WOLFENZON
[2002], the extraction of private benefits is inefficient and its marginal return de-
creases. In addition, private-benefit extraction affects all shares equally.
3 Tender Offers and Minority Blockholders
The tender-offer game is analysed by backward induction: share values in the case
of a successful takeover, the equilibrium outcome for a given bid, and the resulting
optimal bidding strategy are derived in turn. Finally, the tender-offer outcomes in
the presence of a minority blockholder are compared with the outcomes when target
ownership is fully dispersed.
a coalition of manager and blockholder. Endogenous private-benefit extraction by I in
collusion with M would not alter our qualitative results.
5 As the takeover outcome is certain in our setting, it is irrelevant whether the costs
accrue before or after the takeover (in stage 1 or 3).
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3.1 Resource Allocation and Shareholder Wealth
Consider first the case where the takeover bid succeeds and R owns a fraction
β ≥ 1/2 of shares. R is entitled to a fraction β of the cash flow and can decide
the fraction of resources, φ, allocated to his exclusive benefits. As the extraction of
private benefits entails a deadweight loss l(φ), R chooses φ to maximize his payoff
β(1 − φ)vR + [φ − l(φ)]vR.
Denote by φβ the solution to the first-order condition 1 − β = l′(φ). Assumption 1
ensures that φβ is interior and decreases with increasing shareholding β. When
choosing φ, the bidder inefficiently reduces the value of both his and the minority
shares. As β increases, the bidder internalizes more of the inefficiency and extracts
less private benefits, which in turn leads to higher security benefits.
LEMMA 1 As β increases, R’s private benefits [φβ − l(φβ)]vR decrease and the
posttakeover share value (1 − φβ)vR increases.
If the takeover fails (β < 1/2), M continues to run the firm. The small-shareholder
wealth is vI , and I’s block is worth υ ≥ vI per share. We will refer to a (successful)
bid as value-increasing if it results in R holding β such that
(1 − φβ)vR ≥ vI .
For the time being, we restrict attention to parameter constellations such that any
successful bid is value-increasing:
ASSUMPTION 2 (1 − φ1/2)vR ≥ vI .
We will relax this assumption in section 4, where we discuss the case of potentially
value-decreasing bids.
3.2 Tendering and Bid Price
We now derive the tendering behaviour of shareholders, large and small, for a given
bid price. In the rational-expectations equilibrium outcomes, each shareholder forms
expectations α̂ and η̂ about the fraction tendered by I and by the small shareholders,
and hence about the bidder’s final shareholding, i.e., βˆ = α̂ + η̂. In equilibrium, these
expectations must coincide with the actual outcome.
As we will see, two equilibrium outcomes can arise for some bids: one in which
the bid succeeds and one in which it fails. In such instances, we select (somewhat
arbitrarily) the outcome with the higher payoff for the small shareholders. We refer
to the equilibrium outcome selected in this manner as the dominant equilibrium
outcome.6
To describe the equilibrium outcome as a function of the bid price, we define
b∗ ≡ max {(1 − φ1/2)vR ; min {υ ; (1 − φ1/2+α)vR}}.
6 An alternative might be to select the equilibrium with the highest payoff for I .
We discuss this alternative towards the end of this section.
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PROPOSITION 1 For all bids b, there exists a single dominant rational-expectations
equilibrium outcome:
(i) For b < b∗, the bid fails.
(ii) For b ∈ [b∗, vR], the bid succeeds. (a) The blockholder tenders all his shares
(γ = α). (b) The small shareholders tender a fraction η of shares such that b =
(1 − φα+η)vR.
(iii) For b > vR, the bid succeeds and all shares are tendered.
In the remainder of this subsection we derive the proposition.
LEMMA 2 For all bids b, failure is a rational-expectations equilibrium outcome.
With conditional offers and atomistic shareholders, failure of the tender offer is
always an equilibrium, irrespective of the offered bid price. Suppose that no shares
are tendered. A nontendering shareholder has then no incentive to tender, as the
offer would still fail: an individual atomistic shareholder’s decision cannot alter the
tender offer’s outcome, and the blockholder is too small to reverse the outcome on
his own.7
We now determine for each bid whether success can also be an equilibrium
outcome and, if so, whether it dominates failure from the small shareholders’ per-
spective. We begin with two features that all successful bids have in common.
LEMMA 3 In any equilibrium in which the bid succeeds, it must be that b ≥ (1 −
φβ)vR.
Given that small shareholders own more than 50% of the shares, a bid cannot succeed
unless it induces (some of) them to tender. If the bid price is below the posttakeover
share value, no atomistic shareholder will tender. This implies that the well-known
free-riding condition must always be satisfied for a takeover to succeed. That is, the
bid must not be below the posttakeover share value, which we have shown to be
(1 − φβ)vR (Lemma 1).
The second feature of any successful bid concerns I’s tendering behaviour, which
is specific to the setting with endogenous private-benefit extraction and central to
our paper.
LEMMA 4 In any equilibrium in which the bid succeeds, it must be that I sells his
entire block.
PROOF If R’s bid succeeds, I’s payoff is πI = γb + (α − γ)(1 − φγ+η)vR. Since
b − (1 − φγ+η)vR ≥ 0 (Lemma 3) and ∂φγ+η/∂γ < 0 (Lemma 1),
∂πI
∂γ
= b − (1 − φγ+η)vR + (α − γ)∂
[
(1 − φγ+η)vR
]
∂γ
> 0.
Therefore, γ = α is optimal for I . Q.E.D.
7 While unconditional offers typically avoid problems of multiple equilibrium out-
comes, they lead to problems of nonexistence of equilibrium (BAGNOLI AND LIPMAN
[1988]).
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If I were to own some shares following a successful bid, he would have an incentive
to tender additional shares. On the one hand, he would make a nonnegative profit
on these tendered shares [b ≥ (1 − φβ)vR by Lemma 3]. On the other hand, the
shares that he would retain would increase in value because the additional tendered
shares increase R’s shareholdings β, leading to a higher posttakeover share value
(Lemma 1).
Lemma 4 bears some resemblance to the result of HOLMSTRÖM AND NALEBUFF
[1992] that investors holding more shares have greater incentives to tender. In their
model with a finite number of shareholders, a blockholder increases the chance of
success by tendering some shares, thereby increasing the (expected) value of his
retained shares. This additional gain from tendering decreases as the number of
retained shares becomes smaller. As a result, a blockholder will only tender part of
his shareholdings in equilibrium. In the present model, the posttakeover incentive
problem on the part of the bidder leads the blockholder to sell all his shares in
equilibrium.8
LEMMA 5 For all bids b < b∗, failure is the only rational expectations equilibrium
outcome.
PROOF First, a successful bid with b<(1 −φ1/2)vR would implyβ<1/2 (Lemma 3),
a contradiction. Second, suppose that a bid with b < min{υ; (1− φ1/2+α)vR} succeeds.
In this case I’s payoff when tendering is αb. If I retained his shares instead, the
bid would fail. Indeed, β < 1/2 + α (Lemma 3) and η = β − α (Lemma 4) imply
η < 1/2. As I’s payoff in that case is αυ > αb, he is better off retaining his shares,
which is a contradiction (Lemma 4). Q.E.D.
Given that b∗ = max{(1 − φ1/2)vR ; min{υ ; (1 − φ1/2+α)vR}}, two cases need to be
distinguished. First, if a bid b < b∗ = (1 − φ1/2)vR were to succeed, shareholders
would rationally anticipate 50% or more of the shares to be tendered. With R’s share-
holding β exceeding 50%, the posttakeover share value would exceed (1 − φ1/2)vR,
and a fortiori exceed the bid price b. Anticipating this, small shareholders would
all refrain from tendering. Since together they hold more than 50% of the shares,
the bid would fail. This contradicts the premise of success being an equilibrium
outcome.
Second, suppose that a bid b < b∗ = min{υ; (1 − φ1/2+α)vR} were anticipated to
succeed.9 In that case, I would expect to suffer a loss on all the shares he tendered,
as b < υ. Due to the small shareholders’ free-riding behaviour, the anticipated
posttakeover share value would not exceed b, and I would also realize a loss on the
retained shares. Hence, I would prefer the offer to fail. Since b < (1 − φ1/2+α)vR,
R’s posttakeover shareholding must be less than 1/2 + α. Moreover, as I must
8 According to CADSBY AND MAYNES [1998], partial tendering strategies are the
norm in experiments but are rarely observed in the real world, where shareholders
choose to tender either all or none of their shares.
9 Since (1 − φ1/2)vR < (1 − φ1/2+α)vR, this case arises if and only if υ ≥ (1 −
φ1/2)vR.
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be anticipated to tender all his shares (Lemma 4), small shareholders must be
anticipated to tender less than 50% of the shares. This renders I pivotal to the bid’s
success. Since he suffers a loss in the successful bid, he will not tender, thereby
breaking success as an equilibrium outcome.
In conclusion, a bid has to satisfy the restrictions imposed by the large and the
small shareholders’ tendering behaviour in order to succeed. On the one hand, the bid
must satisfy the free-rider condition b = (1 − φβ)vR in order to induce enough small
shareholders to tender their shares. On the other hand, a bid must either be favoured
by I (b ≥ υ) or avoid depending on I’s approval by attracting the necessary majority
(50%) of shares from the small shareholders (b ≥ (1 − φ1/2+α)vR). Otherwise, I is
both decisive for the outcome and in favour of the status quo, and will consequently
let the bid fail by retaining his block. Bids below b∗ violate (at least) one of these
constraints and therefore cannot succeed in a rational-expectations equilibrium.
It only remains to prove parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1.
LEMMA 6 For all bids b ∈ [b∗, vR], the combination γ = α and b = (1 − φα+η)vR
is the only equilibrium outcome in which the bid succeeds. From the small share-
holders’ perspective, this outcome dominates failure.
The rational-expectations equilibrium with b ∈ [b∗, vR] requires that β = βˆ and that
shareholders be ex ante indifferent between tendering and retaining their shares.
The latter condition implies that the bid has to be equal to the expected posttakeover
share value. Suppose, to the contrary, that either b > (1 − φβˆ)v or b < (1 − φβˆ)v.
In the former case nontendering shareholders would be better off accepting the
offer, while in the latter case tendering shareholders would be better off retaining
their shares. Together with the result that I must tender all his shares, i.e., γ̂ = α
(Lemma 4), this implies that the only rational expectation consistent with success
is η̂ such that b = (1 − φα+̂η)vR. This is indeed an equilibrium outcome, as small
shareholders with these expectations are indifferent between tendering and retaining
their shares. So tendering a fraction η̂ is (weakly) optimal.
As regards I’s tendering behaviour, two non-mutually-exclusive cases must be
considered.
Case 1: b ≥ (1 − φ1/2+α)vR. In that case, R’s anticipated posttakeover sharehold-
ings β̂ must exceed 1/2 + α, and so the small shareholders must be anticipated to
tender η̂ ≥ 1/2. These expectations imply that I is not pivotal for the outcome. The
offer would succeed even if I were to retain all his shares. Hence, I anticipates that
the offer will succeed and his payoff will be
πI = γb + (α − γ)(1 − φγ +̂η)vR.
As this payoff increases with γ (Lemma 4), the proposed outcome is indeed an
equilibrium outcome. Moreover, it dominates failure from the small shareholders’
perspective. Their payoff is (1 − φ1/2+α)vR, which by Assumption 2 exceeds the
share value under the incumbent management.
Case 2: b ≥ υ. In that case, I is also better off when the offer succeeds. Irrespective
of whether he is pivotal (η < 1/2) or not, I will find it optimal to tender all his shares,
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since for all γ < α we have b > (1 − φγ+η̂ )vR. Again this equilibrium dominates
failure from the small shareholders’ perspective, because b ≥ υ ≥ vI .
LEMMA 7 For all bids b > vR, all shares are tendered in the only equilibrium
outcome in which the bid succeeds. From the small shareholders’ perspective, this
outcome dominates failure.
If shareholders anticipate that an offer b > vR will succeed, they will all ten-
der, because the posttakeover value is strictly below the bid price, i.e., for all β,
(1 − φβ)vR ≤ vR < b. Hence, the only potential rational expectation is β̂ = 1. Since
β̂ = 1 implies that the bid succeeds, β = 1 is the only equilibrium outcome in case
of success. It also dominates failure, the only other equilibrium outcome, because
b > vR > (1 − φ1/2)vR ≥ vI , the small shareholders’ payoff in case of failure.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that only the equilibrium outcome
of stage 2 has been determined, not the small shareholders’ equilibrium strategies.
For instance, the equilibrium outcome obtains when small shareholders behave
symmetrically, each tendering his shares with probability η and retaining them with
1 − η. Provided that the law of large numbers holds, exactly a fraction η of shares
held by the small shareholders is tendered in equilibrium.
3.3 Optimal Bid
We turn now to the analysis of R’s optimal bid.
PROPOSITION 2 If R makes a tender offer in equilibrium, he bids b∗.
PROOF We know b ≥ b∗. R’s payoff from a successful takeover is πR = β[(1 −
φβ)vR − b]+ [φβ − l(φβ)]vR − c. For b ∈ [b∗,vR], we have b = (1 −φβ)vR (Lemma 3),
so that πR = [φβ − l(φβ)]vR − c ≥ −c, which is decreasing in β (Lemma 1) and there-
fore in b. Finally, b > vR is suboptimal, as it implies β = 1 (Proposition 1), φβ = 0,
and ultimately πR < −c. Q.E.D.
Because of the free-rider problem, R cannot make a gain on the tendered shares,
and the private benefits are his only source of profit. Since private-benefit extraction
entails a convex deadweight loss, a larger stake after the takeover leads to smaller
private benefits and smaller takeover gains. We have established that the equilibrium
supply of shares in successful offers increases with the bid price (Proposition 1).
Therefore, R finds it optimal to bid the lowest price ensuring success, i.e., to set
b = b∗.
3.4 The Effect of a Blockholder
In the case of a fully dispersed ownership (α = 0), R aims at attracting exactly 1/2
of the shares, the minimum amount required to obtain control. The posttakeover
share value is then equal to (1 − φ1/2)vR, and this is also the bid that R must offer to
induce shareholders to tender half of their shares (BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI
[1998]).
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PROPOSITION 3 Relative to the case of a fully dispersed ownership (α = 0), the
presence of a minority blockholder affects the equilibrium outcome as follows:
(i) For υ ≤ (1 − φ1/2)vR, the blockholder has no influence on the outcome.
(ii) For υ > (1 − φ1/2)vR, the presence of a blockholder implies: (a) a higher
bid price and posttakeover share value in case of a takeover; (b) a lower takeover
probability.
PROOF For α = 0, we have b∗ = max{(1 − φ1/2)vR; min{υ; (1 − φ1/2)vR}} = (1 −
φ1/2)vR. For υ ≤ (1 − φ1/2)vR, we have b∗ = max{(1 − φ1/2)vR;υ} = (1 − φ1/2)vR.
Hence, I has no influence. For υ > (1 − φ1/2)vR, we have b∗ = max{(1 − φ1/2)vR;
min{υ; (1 − φ1/2+α)vR}} > (1 − φ1/2)vR. Compared to the case with α = 0, this
leads to a larger β and hence to a higher posttakeover share value (Lemma 1).
The associated lower profits for R in turn imply a lower probability of a take-
over. Q.E.D.
A bid matching the posttakeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered
(b = (1 − φ1/2)vR) also succeeds in the presence of I if this value exceeds the per-
share value of the block under the incumbent management ((1 − φ1/2)vR > υ). Given
that all bids are value-increasing (Assumption 2), this case obtains when I enjoys
no or little private benefit. Large and small shareholders benefit alike from the
takeover. The bid succeeds with I selling his entire block α and small shareholders
tendering 50% − α of the shares. Although I’s tendering decision is decisive, his
presence does not affect the takeover outcome: the bidder offers the same bid price
to acquire the same fraction of shares (50%) as he does when the target is fully
dispersed.
The presence of I matters if, due to (substantial) private benefits, the per-share
value of his block exceeds the posttakeover share value when 50% of the shares are
tendered. In this case an offer can only succeed if the blockholder either prefers
success to failure or is not decisive. This constraint requires the bidder to increase
the bid price until either the blockholder favours the offer or the offer attracts
enough shares (50%) from the small shareholders. A larger minority stake and
larger private benefits increase the bid premium that a bidder has to offer to succeed.
From the small shareholders’ perspective, such blockholder resistance comes with
the benefit of higher takeover premia but also with the cost of a reduced takeover
likelihood.10
Recall that we select the outcome with the highest payoff for the small share-
holders. An alternative criterion would be to select the outcome that maximizes the
blockholder’s payoff. Under this alternative criterion, our main results would still
10 The empirical research on the effects of managerial and outside blockowner-
ship offers conflicting findings. For instance, STULZ, WALKLING, AND SONG [1990]
document that institutional ownership affects the target’s gain negatively, conflicting
with the findings of GASPAR, MASSA, AND MATOS [2005]. MIKKELSON AND PARTCH
[1989] and SONG AND WALKLING [1993] show that targets have lower managerial
ownership than nontargets; AMBROSE AND MEGGINSON [1992] find that neither man-
agerial ownership nor institutional holdings are related to takeover likelihood.
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hold. Specifically, Propositions 1–3 would hold with b∗ ≡ max{(1 − φ1/2)vR; υ}.
The difference would be that the bid must be attractive to the blockholder in order to
succeed. Attracting 50% of the shares from the small shareholders would no longer
be sufficient. Moreover, our selection criterion is biased against the blockholder
having an influence on the tender offer’s outcome. Finally, consider the case υ > vR.
For b ∈ (vR, υ), the alternative criterion would have the undesirable property of se-
lecting the failure equilibrium outcome, in which at least some small shareholders
play a dominated strategy.
To recapitulate the intuition of a passive minority blockholder’s role, consider the
three reasons why the blockholder has a different tendering strategy from the small
shareholders’.
First, to the extent that I enjoys private benefits Λ > 0 under M’s control, he
values the status quo more highly than the small shareholders. Consequently, there
may be bids whose success is in the collective interest of the small shareholders but
not in I’s interest.
Second, I can be pivotal in some circumstances: whenever the fraction of shares
tendered by small shareholders, η, falls in the range [1/2 − α, 1/2). In those cases
– when deciding whether to tender his shares – I compares their value under R’s
control not only with the bid price but also with their current value υ = vI +Λ/α.
The pretakeover share value can thus have an effect on the success of the tender
offer, contrary to the case where ownership is fully dispersed.
Third, conditional on the bid being successful, I has a higher willingness to
tender than small shareholders. In fact, I tenders all his shares in any successful
bid, because he internalizes the appreciation of the untendered shares due to the
increase in R’s final stake. As small shareholders base their decision to tender on the
posttakeover share value, which in turn depends on the fraction of shares tendered,
I’s tendering decision affects their tendering decision. It is therefore impossible for
R to simply bypass I and attract 50% of the shares from small shareholders.11 To win
control, the bidder must induce both the blockholder and (a fraction of) the small
shareholders to tender. Because of I’s reluctance to tender, R is forced to increase
the price offered in order to be successful.
4 (Potentially) Value-Decreasing Bidders
So far, we have abstracted from value-decreasing offers, which have received some
attention in the literature. The main issue is that an equilibrium outcome might exist
in which such an offer succeeds even though all shareholders would fare better if
it failed. The reason is that facing a value-decreasing bid, dispersed shareholders
may confront a pressure-to-tender problem: tendering may be individually rational
to avoid being in a less favourable minority position (see, e.g., BEBCHUK [1988]).
11 As we discuss in section 5, this is possible if posttakeover share value and pri-
vate benefits are exogenous, rendering the presence of a passive minority blockholder
immaterial for the outcome of the tender offer.
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In this section, we show how the presence of a passive minority blockholder can
mitigate this problem.12
Analysing this issue in the context of our model requires making a couple of
adjustments. First, we need to relax Assumption 2 to consider the possibility that bids
below the status quo share value succeed, i.e., (1 − φ1/2)vR < vI . Second, pressure-
to-tender equilibria are Pareto-dominated by failure, and are therefore eliminated
by our selection criterion. In the rest of this section, we consider these equilibrium
outcomes. Technically, this amounts to selecting success as the equilibrium outcome
for all b ≥ b∗.
The arguments we have developed do not rely on Assumption 2, except those
relating to equilibrium selection. Therefore, most results hold unchanged: Failure
is an equilibrium outcome for all bid prices (Lemma 2), and for b ≥ b∗, another
equilibrium outcome exists in which the bid succeeds (Proposition 1). As before,
the raider finds it optimal to bid b = b∗ to attract the minimum number of shares
ensuring success and maximize private benefits (Proposition 2).
From our previous analysis it is immediate that the presence of a minority block-
holder forces a (potentially) value-decreasing bidder to raise his bid. Given that suc-
cess is selected as the equilibrium for all bids b ≥ b∗, it follows that b∗ = (1 − φ1/2)v
is the optimal offer of a value-decreasing bidder in the absence of a blockholder.
As in Proposition 3, the blockholder matters if the per-share value of his minority
block (υ ≥ vI ) exceeds the posttakeover share value when 50% of the shares are
tendered. This always holds in the case of a value-decreasing bidder, who is defined
by (1 − φ1/2)vR < vI . To succeed, the bidder must therefore increase the bid price
until the blockholder favours the offer (b = υ) or the offer attracts 50% of shares
from dispersed shareholders (b = (1 − φ1/2+α)vR), whichever comes first.
The higher bid price translates into a greater supply of shares in equilibrium. The
larger stake in turn induces the bidder to internalize more of the change in security
benefits that he brings about. This has several effects. First, a bidder who would
decrease security benefits but enjoy large private benefits might find it too costly to
take over the firm (deterrence effect). Second, when a bidder is not deterred, a larger
stake reduces the decrease in security benefits that he brings about (improvement
effect). This reduction might possibly be so large as to become a value improvement
(redemption effect). All three effects increase shareholder wealth. While this increase
is augmented by the blockholder’s private benefits prior to the takeover, it does not
rely on such benefits. Indeed, b∗ > (1 − φ1/2)vR even if υ = vI (which is equivalent
to Λ = 0).
12 One might wonder how likely such value-decreasing bids are. Two remarks
may be in order. First, while value-decreasing offers seem unlikely with cash bids,
they may be more realistic when the means of payment include stocks or other
harder-to-value financial assets. Second, although our analysis assumes a single bid-
der, it extends unchanged to the case of a second bidder without private benefits
(see GROSSMAN AND HART [1988]). There, a value-decreasing offer is not necessar-
ily below the no-takeover share value, but must be below the share value following
a takeover by the rival, which may be harder to value.
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5 Relation to the Literature
The present paper belongs to the takeover literature that considers targets with less
than fully dispersed ownership structures. One strand shows that tender offers can
be profitable when the target has a finite number of shareholders (BAGNOLI AND
LIPMAN [1988]; HOLMSTRÖM AND NALEBUFF [1992]). Each shareholder takes into
account that his decision may be pivotal, rather than negligible, for the outcome.
Hence, he is willing to tender at a price below the posttakeover share value, leaving
the bidder some profits. Another strand of this literature argues that a bidder who
owns a stake in the target prior to the bid can earn a profit even if the target’s
ownership is otherwise fully dispersed (GROSSMAN AND HART [1980]; SHLEIFER
AND VISHNY [1986]; CHOWDHRY AND JEGADEESH [1994]). While the bidder does
not make a profit on the shares acquired in the tender offer, he collects the value
improvement of his initial stake.13 A pretakeover stake can also affect the bidder’s
behaviour in bidding contests, e.g., make him bid more aggressively (BURKART
[1995]; SINGH [1998]; BULOW, HUANG, AND KLEMPERER [1999]).
A third strand shows that blockownership by incumbent management can be im-
portant for the outcome of a takeover. When the incumbent has a majority of the
votes, a control transfer can only occur with his consent. Transactions of majority
(voting) blocks necessarily benefit buyer and seller, but may have a positive or nega-
tive impact on small shareholders (KAHAN [1993]; BEBCHUK [1994]). When the
incumbent owns a large minority block,14 control can be transferred either through
a (hostile) tender offer or through a block trade. BURKART, GROMB, AND PANUNZI
[2000] show that both incumbent and new controlling party prefer to trade the block,
because it excludes the small shareholders from a larger share of the takeover gains.
STULZ [1988] considers an incumbent manager who owns a block of voting shares
and values control so highly that he never tenders. The supply of the remaining
dispersed shares is upward sloping because small shareholders have heterogeneous
opportunity costs of tendering. As the managerial block increases, the bidder needs
to offer a higher premium in order to attract the required larger fraction of the
dispersed shares. FERREIRA, ORNELAS, AND TURNER [2005] show that large man-
agerial blockownership can preclude efficient control transfers. In their complete-
contract framework, asymmetric information about managerial talent coupled with
inefficient extraction of private benefits generates resistance to control changes. As
the managerial block increases, the surplus generated by a control transfer decreases,
thereby reducing the rents available to induce managers not to resist.
Many of these (and other) takeover models assume that the posttakeover minority
share value and the private benefits of control are exogenous. This assumption
13 KYLE AND VILA [1991] show that noise trading allows the bidder to acquire an
initial stake on the open market at favourable prices so that a takeover can become
profitable.
14 Control over a firm does not necessarily require a majority of votes. In particu-
lar, when the remaining shares are dispersed, a minority block may be sufficient. For
instance, neither the Ford nor the Wallenberg families own a majority of votes.
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implies that the presence of a passive minority blockholder is immaterial for the
tender-offer outcome. In order to succeed, the bidder must induce enough small
shareholders to tender. Because of the free-rider problem, small shareholders tender
only if the bid price at least matches the posttakeover share value, which is given
and independent of the bidder’s final shareholdings. The blockholder’s tendering
decision is irrelevant, as he is not decisive, owning a nonblocking minority stake.
For the presence of a passive minority blockholder to matter, one must depart
from the standard model’s property that the supply of shares by small shareholders
is perfectly elastic (at the exogenous posttakeover share value). Instead, one needs
an upward-sloping supply function. In our model, this property is generated by the
endogenous private-benefit extraction. Alternatives include models with atomistic
but heterogeneous shareholders, and models with a finite number of shareholders.
If the small shareholders’ opportunity costs of tendering differ due to varying
liquidity needs or tax rates, the supply of shares in the tender offer is upward
sloping (STULZ [1988]; STULZ, WALKLING, AND SONG [1990]).15 In such a setting,
the presence of minority blockholder can affect the equilibrium bid price. For
example, if the blockholder has the highest opportunity cost of tendering, the bid
securing a 50% supply of the shares increases. Furthermore, a blockholder opposed
to a takeover, i.e., with the highest opportunity cost, never tenders his shares even
if the bid succeeds. In the present model, a blockholder who is opposed to the bid
always sells his shares if the bid succeeds.
In a setting with a finite number of shareholders, a blockholder’s tendering strategy
differs from that of the small shareholders.16 As pointed out in the discussion of
Lemma 4, the logic of the model with a finite number of shareholders suggests that
large shareholders tender some but not all their shares in equilibrium. Beyond this
insight, the influence of a minority blockholder on the takeover outcome is an open
question, as this literature has yet to derive a mapping of ownership concentration
(block size) into equilibrium bid prices.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the presence of a passive minority blockholder, who does
not counterbid but merely decides whether or not to tender, can lead to a higher
bid price. The result is driven by the inefficient extraction of private benefits, which
entails that the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder’s final holding.
The positive relationship implies that the small shareholders’ supply in the tender
offer increases with the bid price but decreases with increasing number of shares
15 An upward-sloping expected-supply curve can also obtain if the shareholders’
(common) opportunity costs of tendering are unknown to the bidder (HIRSHLEIFER
AND TITMAN [1990]).
16 CORNELLI AND LI [2002] assume that arbitrageurs, who own a nonnegligi-
ble stake, consider themselves as nonatomistic and are therefore willing to tender at
a price below posttakeover share value.
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tendered by the blockholder. It also means that the blockholder tenders his entire
block in an equilibrium in which the bid succeeds. As a result, the blockholder is
potentially decisive for the outcome of the tender offer, which matters if he values
the status quo highly. In this case, the bidder must offer a higher price either to
win the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares from the small investors
so that this support is no longer needed. This benefits small shareholders, provided
that the takeover is actually launched. Moreover, the presence of a passive minority
blockholder represents a partial safeguard against value-decreasing bids.
We conclude by discussing some implications of our model. First, the presence
of a large shareholder has a similar effect to that of a supermajority rule: it increases
the fraction of shares tendered in equilibrium. Moreover, as it reduces the bidder’s
profit, a large shareholder acts as an antitakeover device. We should therefore expect
the presence of supermajority and antitakeover devices to be inversely correlated
with the presence (and size) of a large shareholder. Another interesting feature of
our model is that the effect of a blockholder is not necessarily discontinuous at 50%.
Suppose that the incumbent blockholder enjoys large private benefits, making him
opposed to a control transfer. In order to succeed nonetheless, the bidder needs to
attract 50% of the shares from the small shareholders, i.e., bid b∗ = (1 − φ1/2+α)vR.
As the incumbent’s stake increases towards a majority block (50%), the lowest price
ensuring success increases towards vR, a price at which the bidder does not make
any profits to recoup the takeover costs. Or putting it differently, little happens in
our framework when the incumbent’s stake drops somewhat below 50%. Majority
blocks and (very) large minority blocks both constitute an insurmountable obstacle
to hostile takeovers.
Second, our model considers unrestricted bids as stipulated by the mandatory bid
rule (MBR). In the absence of the MBR, the bidder would bid b = (1 − φ1/2)vR and
restrict his offer to 50% of the shares. Such an offer would succeed, as tendering
would be a (weakly) dominant strategy. This outcome coincides with that under the
MBR but in the absence of a passive minority blockholder. Hence, the effects of
such a blockholder, highlighted in section 3, materialize only in a regime with the
MBR. Unless tender offers are unrestricted, the presence of a minority blockholder
never forces the bidder to offer a higher price. With unrestricted offers, a higher price
and the consequent acquisition of more than 50% of the shares may be necessary to
simultaneously satisfy the free-rider condition and secure the blockholder’s support
(or attract enough shares from the small shareholders). Thus, our model implies
that the MBR can have a positive effect on target shareholder wealth, whereas it is
immaterial in models with exogenous private benefits.
Finally, consider the impact of deviations from the one-share–one-vote rule. For
simplicity, assume that there are only two classes of shares – voting and nonvoting
– each of them carrying the same fraction of cash-flow rights. The bidder will only
make an offer for the voting shares. In the absence of a blockholder, the bidder
would try to acquire 50% of the voting shares. In case of success, the bidder would
own 25% of the cash-flow rights and would extract higher private benefits than in the
one-share–one-vote structure. As private benefits come at the expense of share value,
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the presence of nonvoting shares decreases the equilibrium bid. A lower bid renders,
ceteris paribus, the blockholder more resistant to the tender offer. Consequently,
deviations from one-share–one-vote magnify the effect of the presence of a minority
blockholder on the takeover outcome.
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